Makalah Paige Johnson Tan

On Party System Institutionalization
Paige Johnson Tan
Department of Political Science
University of North Carolina, Wilmington
tanp@uncw.edu

Introduction

That Indonesia is experiencing its second post-authoritarian elections in 2004 is an achievement worth marking. It would have been impossible to have foreseen in May 1998, the month of Suharto’s resignation, the tumultuous journey Indonesia has undergone. Much has changed. Hundreds of parties have emerged, twenty-four of which have qualified to participate in the 2004 general elections. The presidency has turned over three times. The Constitution and laws have been revised to open greater space for popular participation. A free press flourishes (with all its strengths and weaknesses). Devolution of powers to the regions has been fraught with difficulties, but it is transforming the Indonesian political landscape.

However, many Indonesians remain pessimistic because much about politics seems the same: Golkar, the Suharto-era ruling vehicle, is widely forecasted to emerge the largest parliamentary party out of the 2004 elections; the military continues to influence politics, despite its imminent formal withdrawal from appointed legislative representation; and few former officials have been called to account for human rights violations committed under the former regime. Further, the reform agenda appears in many ways to have stalled. The elections of 2004 play a role in the disenchantment of many since, despite the initiation of the directly elected presidency, the election is unlikely to provide a decisive governing solution to deal with the country’s numerous problems. Many of the same faces will emerge after the elections as power brokers in a not-so-new Indonesia.

The reformers’ pessimism is in part a result of the lack of institutionalization of Indonesia’s contemporary party system. In much of the literature on transitions, the role of political parties is seen to be key. To Linz and Stepan, the development of political parties is part of the development of “political society,” by which they mean, “that arena in which the polity specifically arranges itself to contest the legitimate right to exercise control over public power and the state apparatus.” As Linz and Stepan as well as O’Donnell and Schmitter recognize, often it is not the political parties which bring down the old regime (this is typically brought about on the backs of union members, human rights campaigners, and students, among others), but it is to the political parties that one must look to observe the kernel of consolidation apparent in the transition. Consolidation requires political parties to build a new system of competition for political office. O’Donnell and Schmitter see the founding election as “provoking parties” into action for the “party is the modern institution for structuring and aggregating individual preferences.” Observers of areas as diverse as Russia, Portugal, and Chile have seen the role of parties as key to understanding the progress (or lack thereof) of the transition.

This discussion builds primarily from Mainwaring and Scully’s 1995 volume on Latin America, Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America. Mainwaring, working alone, has gone on to develop further the ideas first presented in the 1995 study with his 1998 article, ”Party Systems in the Third Wave,” and his 1999 book, Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization: The Case of Brazil. According to Mainwaring and Scully, past work on parties and party systems has focused almost exclusively on Sartori’s measures of the party system: the number of parties and the degree of polarization. These are, to the authors, more relevant to a discussion of Western European politics. Developing and developed countries might well share features if evaluated based on the number of parties. Why, then, do the political systems operate so differently, the authors ask. To Mainwaring and Scully, the answer lies in different degrees of party system institutionalization.

For the authors, an institutionalized party system is one in which there is stability in inter-party competition, parties have somewhat stable roots in society, parties and elections are accepted as the legitimate means to determine who governs, and party organizations have relatively stable rules and structures. To Mainwaring and Scully, institutionalization of the party system is key, not so much as an end in itself, but for what a relative lack of institutionalization (what Mainwaring and Scully call “inchoate party systems” and what Mainwaring later calls “fluid” systems) can tell us about a country. Historically, holding politicians accountable has been difficult, legislatures weak, and government legitimacy low in countries with weak party systems, such as Bolivia, Brazil, and Ecuador. In these systems, “politics has a patrimonial flavor, as individual interest, political party, and public good are fused.” To Indonesia observers, much should sound familiar in the inchoate party system.

I have written elsewhere on the institutionalization of Indonesia’s post-Suharto party system (Interested readers might refer to “Party Rooting, Political Operators, and Instability in Indonesia: A Consideration of Party System Institutionalization in a Communally Charged Society,” presented to the Southern Political Science Association in January 2004). The impending elections give us a chance to think again about the level of institutionalization in the party system and what it means for governance and democracy in Indonesia.

Examining Party System Institutionalization in 2004
Inter-party Competition

Scholars examining party system institutionalization look to inter-party competition as providing a clue to the relative stability or instability of the overall complex of party relationships and voter preferences. Traditionally, this is measured through volatility from one election to the next. Since Indonesia’s 2004 elections are only our second post-authoritarian election, a clearer evaluation of this criterion will be possible only after the 2004 vote results are in.

Polling by the International Foundation for Election Systems and the Asia Foundation in the run-up to the elections, though, suggests that a high-level of volatility is to be expected (that is, share fo the vote by party will swing from 1999 to 2004). About two-thirds of voters have been characterized by the Asia Foundation as potentially floating this time around.

Beyond volatility, we may look at the nature of inter-party competition as providing insight into the evolving party system. Thus far, competition has in most cases been moderate. Violence in the 1999 elections was less than in the last controlled elections of the Suharto era in 1997. Rules on the conduct of the campaign were widely disregarded in 1999; however, oversight bodies in 2004 have already shown a greater willingness to crack down on rule breakers (handing out fines for early campaigning, for example). This phenomenon should help to keep party competition within the confines of the rules to a greater degree this year. Importantly, too, the results of the elections are likely to be respected.

Stable Roots

As with volatility above, scholars examining party system institutionalization are interested in whether the component parties of a system have stable roots in the population. If stable roots are present (the parties are tied to some grouping based on class, region, ethnic group, or religious affiliation), volatility will be low—since few voters will shift parties from election to election, thus providing some stability to the party system.

Indonesia’s parties are interesting in this regard. Though the larger parties from 1999 have much similarity to Indonesia’s historical parties and can be slotted in to similar party streams (aliran, or families), a number of changes have been introduced in the intervening years to loosen the roots. To discussion just a selection of these changes, first, long years of socialization under authoritarian rule have taught Indonesians that parties are divisive and self-interested, thus perhaps contributing to a weakening of voter-party affiliation. Second, Indonesian society has itself changed in the intervening years, with many Muslims becoming more pious, as an example. Despite this, it is by no means certain that pious Muslims will vote exclusively for Muslim parties this time around. In addition, greater prosperity has pushed many Indonesians, particularly in the urban areas, beyond stream. They seek solutions and program rather than charisma and symbols. Third, a number of parties have arisen which appear to cross streams. Golkar, for example, seems to encompass both nationalist and Muslim aspirations. PPP, in addition, represents a fused party drawing in different areas on both modernist and traditionalist Muslims for support. Fourth, a number of parties have arisen which have attempted to present themselves (either directly or indirectly) as post-stream, “modern” parties. These could include Amien Rais’ PAN, Ryaas Rasyid’s Partai Persatuan Demokrasi Kebangsaan, and Sjahrir’s Partai Perhimpunan Indonesia Baru.

It is to be expected that a high-level of volatility would be apparent in the early years following a transition from authoritarian rule, as voters take time to discover their preferences. Stable roots would calm this volatility. It appears from opinion polling that preferences are by no means yet set.

Legitimacy

The failure of Indonesia’s new governments to solve the fundamental problems plaguing the country (such as economic difficulties, corruption, and regional challenges) and the ways the parties have conducted themselves since the elections (particularly with regard to the impeachment of Abdurrahman Wahid) have led to the development of a deep sense of unease among many Indonesians. It is particularly the parties that bear the brunt of popular dissatisfaction. On an almost daily basis, the parties are lambasted in the press. The country is said to be undergoing a “moral crisis.” The parties are seen to be machinating, self-interested, corrupt, immature, polarizing, bankrupt, and ineffective. Many Indonesians have begun to long for a post-party savior who is able to take the national interest into account.

A 2002 urban poll suggests strong levels of dissatisfaction with the parties. The LP3ES/CESDA survey, released in February 2002, asked respondents which party put the people’s interests first. While no overall breakdown was given on the responses to this question, the responses as broken down by party affiliation are telling. Among those affiliated with PDI-P, 44% said no party puts the people’s interest first. Among those affiliated with Golkar, 62% said no party puts the people’s first and so on down the line: PPP 67%, PKB 37%, PAN 57%, PBB 31%, PK 35%. Those that chose the party to which they were affiliated as most representing the people’s interest were relatively few: PDI-P 39%, Golkar 11%, PPP 17%, PKB 48%, PAN 22%, PBB 38%, and PK 35%.

The 2003 IFES poll, a national survey, showed declines in the trust with which individual parties were regarded. From 2002-2003, PDI-P dropped from a trust figure of 72% to 50%, PPP from 67% to 52%. The other parties also experienced declines: PAN 61% to 47%, PKB 61% to 50%, PBB 56% to 50%, and Golkar 50% to 48%. Fatigue with democracy’s inability to provide governing solutions appears to have set in.

Absent any dramatic improvement in the parties’ behavior, we might expect this dissatisfaction at some point to be converted into a loss of legitimacy by the parties. But, as Przeworski makes clear, legitimacy is a relative concept. “What matters for the stability of any regime is not the legitimacy of this particular system of domination but the presence or absence of acceptable alternatives.” The legitimacy of the parties may be declining in an overall sense, but the parties are strongly embedded in the current system of government (through the party and election laws), and there are currently no legitimate alternatives.

Stable Rules and Structures

“So far not one of the political parties has been able to establish an institution.” That was the verdict of political scientist and lecturer in the School of Social and Political Sciences at the University of Indonesia Adrinof Chaniago. Using Mainwaring and Scully’s institutionalization framework, one finds this statement supported.

The parties as organizations are weak. Funding is irregular. Party overlap with supporting organizations is in some cases sufficient to raise concerns about party autonomy. Personalistic parties are rife. Major parties have been ripped by factions, leading to splits in all the top six parties from 1999. On the plus side, parties control processes of candidate selection, thus assuring a degree of party discipline. Also, party switching has been relatively infrequent when compared with wildly chaotic systems such Russia’s. Party organizations in the localities are weak, relying often on informal, extra-party processes, and inactive outside of the election cycle. With the exception of perhaps the two largest parties, no parties are truly national in scope. These organizational criteria matter because in order for parties to provide stability to the political system over the long term, the parties as organizations must be “infused with value.”

Meaning for Governance and Democracy

Indonesia’s 2004 elections provide a landmark for us to take stock of Indonesia’s contemporary democracy. That we are here today discussing free elections in Indonesia is a testament to all the country has endured and achieved over the past six years.

I have argued here and elsewhere that the degree of institutionalization of Indonesia’s party system has much to tell us about the nature of governance and prospects for democracy. Indonesia’s political parties are in certain ways very strong. The position they are given in the political system by virtue of the country’s political laws (first revised in January 1999) is strong. The proportional representation electoral system strengthens the parties, and the party central leaderships particularly. Cultural values as written into the work rules of the legislature make the parties stronger still. With an emphasis on the indigenous values of musyawarah and mufakat (consultation and consensus), as opposed to the “Western practice” of voting, the party leaderships, in consultation with one another, are able to shepherd most of parliament’s business. In addition to their strong position in Indonesia’s institutions, the parties, with a few exceptions, are also hardwired into the country’s socio-cultural cleavages. This is a form of “stable roots” as would be recognized by Mainwaring and Scully. But, when accompanied by parties run in an elitist, “leader-and-masses” manner, parties that are divided along the same socio-cultural divisions as the population can be a formula for communal conflict, as channeled through the political parties. This has been the case in Indonesia.

Indonesia’s parties are also weak. As just mentioned, the party leaders have shown themselves willing to exploit the basest communal sentiments for partisan advantage. This has polarized inter-party competition, even in the absence of substantive policy disagreements. In fact, the Islam-secular cleavage, the greatest programmatic difference displayed by the parties, has thus far been less polarized than the modernist Islam-traditionalist Islam cleavage manipulated to such effect by party leaders representing the two tendencies (it was this cleavage that was brought most sharply to the fore in the Abdurrahman Wahid impeachment drama). Indonesia’s parties are also weak because they are divorced from the population, almost uniformly elite-led creations which, while having a somewhat stable socio-cultural constituency, have no stable popular involvement in decision-making. In addition, many of the parties are personalistic, trading on the charisma of socially prominent persons for votes. Finally, the parties are underdeveloped as organizations. Many, born only since Suharto’s fall, have struggled with a lack of internal rules, party splits, unprofessional management, and inability to develop an organization of national breadth.

The parties’ strengths, then, make the parties’ weaknesses worse. Because the party central leaderships are in a strong position in the legislature and the parties are personalistic, party leaders have little incentive to develop their organizations. Because the parties have socio-cultural ties to the population and the ability to call out mobs to support their stances, they have little incentive to engage in political education or dialogue with the population. Because the parties are strong, they can behave with impunity, unaccountable to the wishes of the population. As an example, the parties had the ability to spend almost a year and a half on the impeachment of Abdurrahman Wahid when it was abundantly clear through repeated opinion polling that the population’s first priority was getting the economy back on track. The parties fiddled (impeached) while Indonesia burned (continued to experience severe economic difficulties). The parties’ startling weaknesses have contributed to a climate in which their legitimacy is dissipating. The elections of 2004 are unlikely to provide a decisive governing solution which would reverse the parties’ slide.